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Abstract
This paper studies how a ﬁrm fosters formal and informal interactions among its employees to
create a collective identity and positively inﬂuence eﬀort. We develop a model where employees
have both a personal and a social ideal for eﬀort, and where the ﬁrm can make its workforce
more sensitive to this social ideal by allocating part of the work time to social interactions. We
show that by investing in social capital, the ﬁrm can increase the power of peer pressure, make
screening among heterogeneous employees less costly and, ﬁnally, augment the eﬀectiveness of
monetary incentives.
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Our oﬃces and cafes are designed to encourage interactions between Googlers within
and across teams, and to spark conversation about work as well as play.
(Google website, 2012)
I call it the `pronoun test', I ask frontline workers a few general questions about the
company. If the answers I get back describe the company in terms like `they' and `them,'
then I know it's one kind of company. If the answers are put in terms like `we' or `us,'
then I know it's a diﬀerent kind of company.
(Former U.S. Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, when visiting a company for the
ﬁrst time)
1 Introduction
United Parcel Service (thereafter UPS) is known as a company constantly striving to improve its
eﬃciency: packages are sorted by computers to optimize the order of delivery; delivery routes are
designed to avoid left turns, so that there is no time wasted on waiting for a gap in oncoming
traﬃc; drivers are required to carry key rings on a ﬁnger to avoid looking for them, and they
have to keep a fast pace when walking. In this company that is continuously looking to save
seconds along the supply chain, a somewhat unexpected practice takes place: several minutes are
granted to drivers and loaders for a pre-work huddle, a team gathering before the drivers leave the
distribution center. According to UPS management, the objective of this practice is to engender
a team spirit between loaders and drivers. Favoring a certain amount of social bonding among
employees is not speciﬁc to UPS. Over the past few decades, many ﬁrms have introduced new
practices to make it easier for employees to develop formal and informal interactions (Cohen and
Prusak, 2001). New physical spaces like open-plan oﬃces, places to relax, and meeting points
have been designed to promote an environment of communication and information sharing among
colleagues. Workshops and brainstorming sessions have aimed at generating collective creativity and
mutual understanding. Information technologies such as emails, intranet and chats have favored
exchanges. Team building activities, deﬁned as a variety of practices ranging from simple bonding
exercises to complex simulations and multi-day retreats, have been designed to develop a sense of
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cohesiveness among employees.
Why do ﬁrms allocate time and space resources to foster interactions between their employees?
Besides creating a great atmosphere and facilitating the appearance of new ideas, the literature
on organizational identiﬁcation, a subﬁeld in the management literature, has suggested that by
promoting formal and informal interactions among employees a ﬁrm may be seeking to induce its
workforce to identify as part of a collective (the group or the organization) and behave in ways that
are normative for the collective identity (e.g. Pratt, 2000; Ellemers, De Gilder and Haslam, 2004;
Van Dick, 2004; Cohen and Prusak, 2001).1 According to these authors, shifting the employees'
identity from being personal ("I") to collective ("we") has two positive consequences. First, the
group-based expectations, goals, or outcomes become a source of implicit incentives for workers,
coming to supplement or even replace other explicit and implicit incentives. Second, by promoting
the collective identity, the ﬁrm can hold possibly heterogeneous employees together and secure their
involvement in the working environment.2
In this context, the rise of practices aimed at encouraging employees' interaction and building
collective identities could be interpreted as an attempt by ﬁrms to counter increased external and
internal volatility caused by higher employee turnover, reduced workforce loyalty, new partnerships
or mergers and acquisitions (Cohen and Prusak, 2001; Casey, 1996). Casey (1996) notes for example
that the devices of workplace family and team manifest a corporate eﬀort to provide emotional
gratiﬁcations at work to counter the attractions of rampant individualism.
In this paper we develop an agency model with social norms to formalize the idea that a ﬁrm
1Cohen and Prusak give numerous examples of ﬁrms providing space and time to allow their employees to
interact. Among other examples, they describe how Alcoa, the world's leading producer of aluminum, moved to a
new headquarter in 1998 in which glass-walled conference rooms, meeting places, kitchens, and escalators occupy the
center of each ﬂoor of oﬃces and are designed to encourage workers to meet, mix, and chat. According to the CEO
of Alcoa, Paul O'Neill, the ultimate goal was to promote a sense of connection among employees. In the opposite
way, Cohen and Prusak quote the following extract of a book by Robin Dunbar (grooming gossip and the evolution
of language), in which the author explains why a TV production unit had productivity and morale problems after
being moved to a new workplace: It turned out that when the architects were designing the new building, they
decided that the coﬀee room where everyone ate their sandwiches at lunch time was an unnecessary luxury and so
dispensed with it ... If people were encouraged to eat their sandwiches at their desks, then they were more likely to
get on with their work and less likely to idle time away. And with that, they inadvertently destroyed the intimate
social networks that empowered the whole organization (italics added).
2The literature on organizational identiﬁcation is based upon insights from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1972;
Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identity theory suggests that a person's identity is composed of two diﬀerent facets.
Personal identity corresponds to individual attributes that are not to be shared with other people. Social identity
corresponds to the person's internal deﬁnition that results from him or her being member of a social group. The
literature on organization identiﬁcation goes a step further by suggesting that an organization can reinforce its
employees' social identity through social bonding or training in order to create implicit group incentives.
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may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to allocate time for its employees to interact, develop social ties and create
a collective identity. An employee's identity is modelled as an ideal for eﬀort, which is a weighted
combination of a personal ideal and a shared social ideal. Personal ideals might diﬀer across employ-
ees and are not observed by the ﬁrm. This gives rise to an adverse selection problem. Employees
perform independent production tasks which means that the only externalities among workers are
social and not technological. We are then able to obtain three main results. First, we reason for
a given employees' sensitivity to the social ideal and determine the optimal payment scheme. We
show that the more employees are sensitive to the social norm, the higher will be the power of
monetary incentives chosen by the ﬁrm and its proﬁts. This result is due to an eﬀect known in the
economic literature as the social multiplier eﬀect which, when applied to an agency context, means
that the existence of the social norm reinforces the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives (see for
example Fischer and Huddart, 2008). Second, we allow the ﬁrm to alter the employees' sensitivity
to the social norm by choosing the part of the work time allocated to social interactions. For the
ﬁrm there is a cost of investing in social capital because less time is left for production. There is
also a beneﬁt: by favoring social bonding the ﬁrm makes its workforce more sensitive to the social
ideal. We show that the ﬁrm allocates more time for social interactions when employees have low
personal ideals for eﬀort. Motivating employees through the collective identity is used as a substi-
tute to low individual work ethics. Third, we show that investing in social capital allows the ﬁrm to
alleviate the informational problem due to adverse selection. By promoting the shared social ideal,
the ﬁrm is able to limit the eﬀect of heterogeneity on individual behaviors and therefore to diminish
the contractual distortions due to incomplete information. The consequence is that the ﬁrm gives
employees more time to develop social ties when the workforce is heterogeneous. Note that the last
two results are consistent with the ﬁndings from the literature on organizational identiﬁcation.
There is a burgeoning theoretical literature that suggests that social norms have important
eﬀects on workers' behavior in the workplace. Kandel and Lazear (1992) assume that members
of a team suﬀer a utility loss when their own eﬀort level falls short of that of their co-workers.
The consequence is that workers exert more eﬀort than if peer eﬀects were absent. In an agency
context, Fischer and Huddart (2008) show how the existence of social norms fosters the eﬀectiveness
of monetary incentives. Although they do not solve for the optimal contract, they derive some
implications regarding the organizational boundaries of ﬁrms by distinguishing between a desirable
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and an undesirable action, each with its own norm. Hück, Kübler and Weibull (2012) show that a
particular norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the incentive
scheme oﬀered by a ﬁrm. They further show that low-eﬀort equilibria (where anyone exerts low
eﬀort because others do the same) can coexist with high-eﬀort equilibria (where anyone exerts high
eﬀort because others do the same). On the empirical side, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010)
study whether the productivity of fruit pickers is aﬀected by the presence of coworkers with whom
they share social ties. They consider a framework in which there are no externalities among workers
in production or compensation. They ﬁnd that compared to the situation without social ties, a given
worker's productivity is signiﬁcantly higher when working with more able friends, but signiﬁcantly
lower when working with less able friends. In the present paper, we rely on the model of Fischer and
Huddart (2008) to introduce a social norm for eﬀort in the employees' preferences. Compared to
the theoretical papers quoted above, we add two new elements into the model. First we assume that
the ﬁrm is able to aﬀect the sensitivity of employees to the shared social ideal by providing them
with time and space to interact and develop social ties. We show that a ﬁrst motive for the ﬁrm
to invest in social capital is to complement the monetary incentives. We characterize the precise
circumstances under which this investment is rewarding. Second we allow for heterogeneity among
employees with regard to their personal ideals for work. The ﬁrm does not observe the personal
ideals which gives rise to a problem of adverse selection. This gives another motive to invest in social
capital, namely creating a shared identity in order to attenuate the eﬀect of individual diﬀerences.
Akerlof and Kranton (2008) also consider an organization that is able to aﬀect its workers' identity
(ideal for eﬀort) through the style of management. There is moral hazard on workers' eﬀort and the
organization can either decide to monitor its workforce tightly or choose loose supervision. They
assume that monitoring workers allows to detect shirking more easily but at the same time reduces
workers' ideal for eﬀort as there is less identiﬁcation with the workgroup. They characterize the
circumstances under which the organization prefers loose supervision. In this article, we endogenize
workers' collective identity and describe more fully the way the ﬁrm is able to regulate this identity.3
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical model. In section 3 we
3Rotemberg (1994) and Dur and Sol (2010) consider models without social norms but in which two workers are
endowed with altruistic preferences they can aﬀect by their choices. In Rotemberg, worker i decides the degree to
which he internalizes the utility of worker j. In Dur and Sol, worker i is able, by engaging social interactions with
worker j, to increase j's degree of altruism. Both papers show that it is rational for workers to invest in altruistic
activities to some extent. In turn the eﬃciency of the equilibrium is enhanced.
5
derive the optimal linear contract. In section 4 we analyze how the ﬁrm can regulate the social
norm among the employees. Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2 Modeling personal and social ideals
We take a framework à la Holmström and Milgrom (1987) and extend it to include a social ideal
for eﬀort and some heterogeneity in the workforce.
Agents. A risk neutral ﬁrm employs a continuum of employees of size one to perform similar, but
independent tasks. Each employee is characterized by his personal ideal for eﬀort, t. Personal ideals
are distributed according to the probability distribution function f(t) deﬁned on a set T =
[
t, t
]
.
Let F (t) denote the cumulative distribution function associated with f(t). Each employee exerts a
level of eﬀort e, not observed by the ﬁrm, and produces a publicly observable output y = e+ε. The
term ε is an idiosyncratic unobservable noise following a centered normal with variance σ2. The
noise terms are independent across employees.
Contracts. As employees are heterogeneous, the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer diﬀerent con-
tracts to diﬀerent employees. We denote the menu of contracts by {w(t)}t∈T where w(t) is the
compensation paid by the ﬁrm to an employee with personal ideal t. As is common in the contract-
ing literature, we restrict attention to linear contracts of the shape w(t) = α(t)y(t) + β(t) where
α(t) is the proportional share and β(t) is the ﬁxed salary. We will refer to α(t) as the power of
incentives for employee of personal ideal t.
Payoﬀs. The CARA utility function of an employee of personal ideal t choosing the contract w(t)
and the eﬀort e(t) is given by
U(w(t), e(t), n(t)) = −exp [−η (w(t)− C(e(t), n(t))] (1)
where η represents the employee's constant absolute risk aversion, and C(e(t), n(t)) = 12c (e(t)− n(t))2
represents the extended cost function of the employee. We assume that it is costly for employee
t to choose an eﬀort level that deviates from an ideal level of eﬀort, n(t). This ideal corresponds
to the eﬀort that the employee exerts when the variable rate of the compensation is zero but the
base salary is suﬃciently high to make the participation constraint we deﬁne below satisﬁed. The
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cost of eﬀort is decreasing up to the point where the ideal is reached and increasing beyond this
point. Following Fischer and Huddart (2008), the ideal n(t) is a weighted average of two elements:
the personal ideal of the employee equal to t and a shared social ideal which we take equal to the
average eﬀort across employees, E [e].4 We write
n(t) = λt+ (1− λ)E [e] (2)
where λ ∈ (0, 1] and
E [e] =
t¯ˆ
t
e(t)f(t)dt (3)
The term 1−λ of expression (2) reﬂects the employees' sensitivity to the social ideal. The standard
cost function is obtained by taking λ = 1 and t = 0. Note that in our framework, production tasks
are independent across employees and payment schemes are based on individual performances. This
means that the only externalities among workers are social and not technological or monetary.
We assume that employees have the same reservation utility level, denoted U(w0). The term w0
is the certain monetary equivalent of the employees' compensation contract.
The risk-neutral ﬁrm's expected proﬁt is equal to the part of the expected production accruing
to ﬁrm net of the ﬁxed salaries paid to the employees:
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt (4)
Timing of the game
• First, the ﬁrm chooses the amount of the work time left for employees to interact. This amount
alters the employees' sensitivity to the social ideal in a way we will make precise in section 4.
• Second, the ﬁrm proposes a menu of contracts {w(t)}t∈T .
• Third, employees choose one contract or exert their outside option.
• Fourth, employees exert eﬀort and productions and payoﬀs are realized.
4Hence, the social norm is associated to a unique reference group which is the entire workforce.
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3 The optimal linear contract
In this section, we assume that the sensitivity of employees to the social norm is given. First, we
derive the optimal level of eﬀort for employees. Second, we solve the problem of the ﬁrm and derive
the optimal menu of linear contracts.
3.1 Problem of an employee
Suppose an employee of personal ideal t has chosen the contract w(t). He chooses his eﬀort level
by maximizing his certainty equivalent payoﬀ
α(t)e(t) + β(t)− 1
2
ησ2α2(t)− 1
2
c (e(t)− n(t))2 (5)
The ﬁrst order condition is α(t)− c(e(t)− n(t)) = 0 , so that
e(t) = n(t) +
α(t)
c
(6)
where n(t) is given by (2). Expression (6) characterizes the eﬀort exerted by the employee given the
work ideal, n(t). If the ﬁrm does not provide any monetary incentive at all (that is, if α(t) = 0),
employee t chooses a level of eﬀort equal to his work ideal. By taking the partial derivative of
expression (6) with respect to α(t), one can study how increasing the monetary incentive at the
margin aﬀects the eﬀort exerted when the eﬀect of the social norm is neutralized. We get
∂e(t)
∂α(t)
=
1
c
(7)
This expression is similar to the one appearing in Holmström and Milgrom (1987). Eﬀort increases
as the ﬁrm provides more monetary incentives. We now endogenize the social norm. By plugging
expression (6) into expression (3) and solving, we obtain the average eﬀort exerted by employees:
E [e] = E [t] +
E [α]
λc
(8)
where E [α] =
´ t¯
t α(t)f(t)dt is the average power of incentives and E [t] =
´ t¯
t tf(t)dt is the average
personal ideal.
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Expression (8) shows there are two sources that fuel employees' eﬀort: personal work ideals and
monetary incentives. Interestingly, the way the average eﬀort depends on the average personal work
ethic is not aﬀected by the employees' sensitivity to the social ideal: for the ﬁrm, having a pro social
workforce does not dampen the positive inﬂuence of personal ideals on eﬀort. However, the way
the average eﬀort depends on the average power of monetary incentives is aﬀected by employees'
sensitivity to the social ideal: a higher sensitivity makes monetary incentives more eﬀective. The
two previous results are driven by similar multiplier eﬀects. For convenience, we only describe the
multiplier eﬀect on monetary incentives. Analytically, it takes the following shape:
dE [e]
dE [α]
=
1
λc
=
1
λ
× ∂E [e]
∂E [α]
(9)
with 1/λ ≥ 1. To explore the functioning of the social multiplier, let us sum expression (6) over
types, weighted by the probability distribution function f . We obtain
E [e] = λE [t] + (1− λ)E [e] + E [α]
c
(10)
Let us suppose that the average power of monetary incentives E [α] increases by an amount equal to
4E [α]. In a ﬁrst round, this has a direct eﬀect on average eﬀort: the right-hand side in expression
(10) increases by 4E [α] /c, which causes the left-hand side E [e] to rise by the same amount. In
the second round, the change in monetary incentives has an indirect eﬀect on eﬀort through the
social norm: a higher social work ideal has emerged at the end of the previous round, inducing the
employees to exert even more eﬀort. Formally, the right-hand side increases by (1 − λ)4E [α] /c,
which causes an equivalent rise of the left-hand side. Summing the successive increases, we obtain:
4E [e] = [1 + (1− λ) + (1− λ)2 + ...] 4E [α]
c
=
1
λ
4E [α]
c
(11)
The multiplier 1λ is the sum of the direct monetary eﬀect, 1, and the indirect social eﬀect,
1−λ
λ .
Using equations (6) and (8), we can write the eﬀort of an employee of personal ideal t as
e∗(t) = λt+ (1− λ)E [t] + 1
λc
(λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]) (12)
Expression (12) states that the eﬀort level e∗(t) is increasing in the power of incentives, α(t). When
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employees are sensitive to the collective (that is, when λ < 1), an employee with a low personal ideal
chooses an eﬀort level above the one he would choose if the sensitivity to the social norm was zero
(that is, when λ = 1). Note that an employee with a high personal ideal does not necessarily choose
a lower eﬀort level when he is more sensitive to the collective identity: although he is attracted by
the lower average work ethic, monetary incentives become more eﬀective so that eﬀort may increase.
Expression (12) also shows that an employee who has chosen a contract with a low (respectively
high) proportional share chooses an eﬀort level above (respectively below) the level he would choose
in the absence of social ideal. We summarize the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (1) Consider a given menu of linear contracts {w(t)}t∈T . Then,
(a) The average level of eﬀort E [e] depends linearly on the average personal ideal E [t]. This
relationship is not aﬀected by the employees' sensitivity to the social ideal.
(b) The average level of eﬀort E [e] is higher when employees are more sensitive to the social
ideal (that is, when λ is smaller).
(2) The fact that employees' preferences incorporate a social ideal creates a social multiplier eﬀect,
deﬁned in (9), on monetary incentives.
To conclude this section, it is interesting to calculate the certainty equivalent payoﬀ for an
employee with personal ideal t when he exerts the optimal eﬀort level (12). We have
u(t, α(t), β(t)) = β(t) +
1− λ
λ
α(t)E [α]
c
+ (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t) + 1
2c
(1− cησ2)α2(t) (13)
Note that ∂2u/∂t∂α(t) = λ > 0: employees with a high personal ideal are more sensitive to an increase
in the power of incentives than employees with a low personal ideal. This single-crossing condition
will help the ﬁrm to screen the diﬀerent types of employees under incomplete information.
3.2 Problem of the ﬁrm
We now turn to the problem of the ﬁrm for a given level of employees' sensitivity to the social ideal.
As a benchmark we ﬁrst consider the situation where the ﬁrm knows the employees' personal ideals.
We then consider the situation where the ﬁrm cannot observe employees' personal ideals.
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3.2.1 The case of complete information
The ﬁrm determines the menu of contracts by maximizing its expected proﬁt
max
{α(t),β(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt (14)
under the participation constraints
∀t ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ w0 (15)
The expression of e∗(t) appears in (12). At the optimum the participation constraints must be
binding. Using expression (13), we show in Appendix 1 that the ﬁrm's program can be written
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λc
+ t− w0 − 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (16)
Maximizing pointwise we obtain the optimal power of incentives:
∀t ∈ T, α∗CI(t) =
1
λ(1 + cησ2)
(17)
where CI stands for complete information. Three things are worth noting about the optimal power
of monetary incentives. First, the ﬁrm chooses the same proportional share for all employees,
regardless of their personal ideals. This is due to the fact that the personal ideal of employees does
not aﬀect the way their eﬀort responds to the monetary incentives: expression (12) implies that
∂2e∗(t)/∂t∂α(t) = 0. Second, the ﬁrm chooses a higher power of incentives when employees are more
sensitive to the social ideal. Indeed the social multiplier eﬀect (9) is higher when employees are
more concerned with the collective. Third, at equilibrium, the ﬁrm has to oﬀer a higher base salary
to employees with a low personal ideal. It comes from the fact that for a given power of incentive
α(t), the certainty equivalent (13) is increasing in the employees' personal ideal. This explains that
under incomplete information, the ﬁrm will have to propose a diﬀerent menu of contracts in order
to prevent employees with high personal ideals to deviate to contracts aimed at employees with low
personal ideals.
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3.2.2 The case of incomplete information
We now assume that the ﬁrm does not observe the employees' personal ideals. The ﬁrm has to
make sure that each type of employee chooses the contract that is specially designed for him. The
proﬁt maximizing program becomes
max
{α(t),β(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt (18)
under the participation constraints
∀t ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ w0 (19)
and the incentive constraints
∀t, t′ ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ u(t, α(t′), β(t′)) (20)
Using standard arguments, we show in Appendix 2 that the optimization problem of the ﬁrm can
be simpliﬁed to
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λc
+ t− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (21)
under the constraints
∀t ∈ T, dα(t)
dt
≥ 0 (22)
Expressions (16) and (21) diﬀer because of the term
´ t
t
λα(t)(1−F (t))
f(t) f(t)dt reﬂecting the informational
rent the ﬁrm has to give to types t > t for them not to deviate from their speciﬁed contracts. This
corresponds to the cost of having incomplete information on employees' personal ideals. Note
that this cost is increasing in λ: the adverse selection problem is more severe when employees are
less concerned with the collective identity. The constraints (22) state that the optimal power of
incentives should be non decreasing with respect to the personal work ideal. We ignore momentarily
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(22), and maximize expression (21) pointwise. We obtain
∀t ∈ T, α∗II(t) =
1
λ(1 + cησ2)
− λ1− F (t)
f(t)
c
1 + cησ2
(23)
where II stands for incomplete information. To guarantee that the constraints (22) are veriﬁed, we
make the following assumption, common in an agency context:
Assumption 1. The hazard rate f(t)1−F (t) is increasing in t.
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Under assumption 1 the ﬁrm will be able to screen employees according to their personal ideals.
The properties of α∗II(t) are described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
1. The power of incentives α∗II(t) is increasing in t. There is no distortion in the contract
designed for the highest personal ideal: α∗II(t¯) = α
∗
CI(t¯) and a downward distortion for the other
personal ideals: α∗CI(t)− α∗II(t) = λ1−F (t)f(t) c1+cησ2 increases as t gets closer to t.
2. The ﬁrm provides stronger monetary incentives when employees are more sensitive to the
social norm: α∗II(t) increases when λ decreases. Furthermore the distortion measured by α
∗
CI(t) −
α∗II(t) decreases when employees are more sensitive to the social norm.
3. The power of incentives α∗II(t) is decreasing in the perceived risk level, ησ
2.
Point 1 of proposition 2 is a result typical of adverse selection problems. To prevent employees
with a high personal ideal to deviate, the ﬁrm has to give employees with smaller personal ideals
a contract where the power of incentives is lower than under complete information, but the ﬁxed
part of the compensation is larger (to satisfy the participation constraint). As a consequence, there
is a downward distortion compared with the case of complete information. Point 2 conveys two
important results. First, the ﬁrm chooses a higher power of monetary incentives when employees
are more sensitive to the social ideal. As employees become more oriented toward the collective, the
social multiplier stated in proposition 1 has a stronger eﬀect on the average eﬀort: dE[e]/dE[α] = 1/λc
increases as λ decreases. Second, the distortion between the complete information case and the
incomplete information case, α∗CI(t)− α∗II(t), is reduced when employees are more sensitive to the
5This assumption is veriﬁed for distributions such as the uniform, the normal, the exponential, the logistic and
the Laplace, among others.
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social norm. In fact the eﬀect of employee's personal ideals on their behavior becomes secondary to
monetary incentives as they become more concerned with the group environment. In this case the
ﬁrm proposes less diﬀerentiated monetary incentives.6
At equilibrium the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm is
pi∗(λ) = E [t]− w0 + 1
2c(1 + cησ2)
t¯ˆ
t
1
λ2
(
1− cλ
2 (1− F (t))
f(t)
)2
f(t)dt (24)
Not surprisingly, the proﬁt is increasing in the average personal ideal, E [t], and increasing when
employees become more sensitive to the social ideal.
4 Regulating the social ideal
We now assume that the ﬁrm is able to aﬀect the social orientation of its workforce by choosing
the amount of time employees can interact. Interactions can for example be favored and somewhat
controlled through workshops and team-building activities, or by facilitating recreational breaks.
There is a large amount of empirical evidence in sociology, management and economics suggesting
that individuals are more sensitive to a group norm when they have frequent interactions with
the other individuals belonging to the group (e.g. Cialdini and Trost, 2008, for sociology; Cohen
and Prusak, 2001, for management; Bandieri, Barankay and Rasul, 2008 and 2010, for economics).
Cohen and Prusak note for example that if you want people to connect, to talk, to begin to
understand and depend on one another, give them places and occasions for meeting, and enough
time to develop networks and communities. Social capital needs breathing room - social space and
time - within work and surrounding work.7 Sociologists emphasize the fact that people learn and
internalize the values embodied in the norms through repeated interactions with others. The act
6Note that if all employees have the same personal ideal tˆ (that is, T =
{
tˆ
}
), then 1−F (tˆ)
f(tˆ)
= 0 and we have
α∗II(tˆ) =
1
λ(1 + cησ2)
We retrieve the result of the complete information case.
7Friedley and Manchester (2005) make a similar point to explain what determines team cohesion in speech teams
in high schools and colleges : It is communication in the human moment that also most powerfully creates team
cohesion - a strong sense of loyalty and commitment to the team vision as one's own ... Whether a room or lounge
where team members can congregate between classes and the end of the day, practice space for formal and informal
coaching sessions, travel time in cars and vans, or social time to enjoy pizza and a movie, both quantity and quality
of communication are necessary to build a cohesive team climate of openness and trust.
14
of matching behaviors and beliefs to a group norm is referred to as conformity and is seen as the
result of unconscious inﬂuences, social pressure, rewards or punishments inﬂicted by the group when
following or not the norm. When individuals interact frequently, they become more aﬀected by these
beneﬁts and costs and they are more willing to bear the emotional investment initially required to
conform: their sensitivity to the group norm increases.
We normalize the length of the employees' work time to 1. The ﬁrm divides the employees' time
between a productive period of length p where the instantaneous production problem is described in
the two previous sections, and a period of length b = 1− p during which social bonding takes place
between employees. As explained above, we assume that the employees' sensitivity to the social
ideal is aﬀected by the choice of the ﬁrm. The more time is allocated to social interactions, the
more employees become sensitive to the social norm. Formally, λ(p) is increasing in p.8 We assume
that during the period in which social bonding takes place, the employees receive their reservation
compensation, w0, at each instant of time. The ﬁrm maximizes
max
p
ppi∗ (λ(p)) + (1− p)(−w0)
where pi∗ (λ) is given by expression (24). Let ελ(p) denote the elasticity of λ with respect to p:
ελ(p) =
pλ′(p)
λ(p) . We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. (a) The function ελ is increasing in p. (b) There is a level pˆ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
ελ(pˆ) = 1/2. Let bˆ = 1− pˆ.
The ﬁrst part of assumption 2 means that investing in social capital has decreasing returns:
when the initial level of interactions is low (respectively high), allowing for more interactions among
employees has a strong positive impact (respectively a low impact) on their sensitivity to the social
norm. The second part of the assumption guarantees that the eﬀect of increasing interactions on
employee's sensitivity to the group is suﬃciently high to ensure that the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to invest in social capital. We determine the optimal length for social interactions in Appendix 3.
The properties are stated in the following proposition.
8It is convenient to express the analytical problem in p rather than in b.
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Proposition 3. Suppose the average personal ideal of employees is E(t) = tˆ.
1. When employees are homogeneous with regard to their personal ideals (T =
{
tˆ
}
), the ﬁrm
chooses to devote a share b∗ of working time to develop the employees' orientation to the social ideal.
We have b∗ = bˆ if tˆ = 0, where bˆ is deﬁned in assumption 2. Furthermore, b∗ is decreasing in tˆ.
2. When employees are heterogeneous with regard to their personal ideals, the ﬁrm chooses to
devote a share b∗∗ of working time for social interactions. We have b∗∗ > b∗. Furthermore b∗∗ is
decreasing in tˆ.
Proposition 3 states two results. First, it is more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to devote time to
develop the employees' social ideal when their average personal ideal is low. In this case eﬀort is
less fueled by personal work ethics and it is therefore less costly for the ﬁrm to substitute productive
activities by bonding activities. Second, for a given average personal ideal, the ﬁrm devotes more
time to develop social interactions for heterogeneous employees than for homogeneous employees.
When employees are heterogeneous, the ﬁrm faces an adverse selection problem when designing the
contracts and it has to give a rent to the employees with a high personal ideal for eﬀort to make
them choose the right contract. By fostering the social orientation of the workforce, the ﬁrm is
able to reduce the eﬀect of heterogeneity on individual behaviors and alleviate the informational
problem. Its proﬁts increase. Note ﬁnally that if assumption 2(b) was not satisﬁed, the ﬁrm would
never allocate time for social interactions if faced with homogeneous employees.
5 Concluding remarks
The literature in economics and management theory have recently emphasized that workers are not
driven solely by personal considerations but are also concerned with the goals and beliefs of the
group or organization in which they work. This observation has lead some authors to suggest that
the ﬁrm could regulate workers' sensitivity to the collective identity in order to foster performance.
In Economics, Organizations and Management, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) note for example that
"important features of many organizations can best be understood in terms of deliberate attempts
to change preferences of individual participants". One way for ﬁrms to shape and change identities
is to foster interactions between employees by providing them with time and space to meet. In this
paper we have developed a model to study the circumstances under which a ﬁrm invests in social
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capital in order to strengthen the social orientation of its employees and provide extra incentives to
exert eﬀort. While there is an opportunity cost associated to bonding activities, namely the lesser
time available for production, there are also two beneﬁts. First, a social multiplier eﬀect makes
monetary incentives more eﬀective. Second, the distorted eﬀect of adverse selection on contracts is
reduced as the shared social ideal becomes more important for employees than their heterogeneous
personal ideals.
The past few decades have seen a surge in the number of ﬁrms using bonding activities. What
has driven such a change? Some researchers suggest that, in times where job security and employees'
attachment to ﬁrms are diminishing, ﬁrms could use soft management policies to shift employees'
identity from being personal to collective (Casey, 1996 or Pratt, 2000). Cohen and Prusak (2001)
explain for example that nurturing professional and personal connections among workers is a way
for ﬁrms to deal with rising volatility and heterogeneity in the workplace. Our model is consistent
with this explanation: a decrease in the average personal work ideals of employees or a greater
heterogeneity of the workforce leads the ﬁrm to allocate more time to bonding activities. Motivating
employees through the collective identity acts as a substitute to declining individual work ethics
and constitutes a solution to deal with a greater heterogeneity in the workforce.
Two extensions of the model could be of interest. First in our framework, there is only one
reference group, namely the entire workforce, relatively to which the social norm of eﬀort is deﬁned.
It could interesting to make the number of reference groups endogenous and consider that employees
choose the group they want to conform to. Second, we assume that employees have the same
sensibility to the social norm. One could therefore extend the framework to allow for diﬀerent
degrees of sensibility.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Derivation of the optimal contract under complete information
Setting expression (5) equal to w0 and using expressions (6) and (12), we can write
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt =
t¯ˆ
t
(
e∗(t)− w0 − 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
(
λt+ (1− λ)E [t] + λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λc
− w0 − α
2(t)
2c
(1 + cησ2)
)
f(t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λc
+ t− w0 − 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt
Appendix 2. Derivation of the optimal contract under incomplete information
We want to show that the program
max
{α(t),β(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t))− β(t)) f(t)dt (25)
subject to
∀t ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ w0 (26)
and
∀t, t′ ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ u(t, α(t′), β(t′)) (27)
can be simpliﬁed to
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λc
+ t− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (28)
subject to the constraints
∀t ∈ T, dα(t)
dt
= 0 (29)
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We follow roughly the method of Laﬀont and Martimort (2001). For convenience let us deﬁne
u(t, t˜) = u(t, α(t˜), β(t˜)) (30)
where
u(t, α(t˜), β(t˜)) = β(t˜) +
1− λ
λ
α(t˜)E [α]
c
+ (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t˜) + 1
2c
(1− cησ2)α2(t˜) (31)
is the certainty equivalent payoﬀ for an employee with personal ideal t when he has chosen the
contract
{
α(t˜), β(t˜)
}
(see equation (13)). Let
u(t) = u(t, t) (32)
Condition (27) implies the following local ﬁrst-order condition for type t:
∂u(t, t˜)
∂t˜
∣∣∣∣
t˜=t
= 0 (33)
or
dβ(t)
dt
+
1− λ
λc
dα(t)
dt
E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])dα(t)
dt
+ (
1
c
− ησ2)α(t)dα(t)
dt
= 0 (34)
The local second-order condition for t is
∂2u(t, t˜)
∂t˜2
∣∣∣∣
t˜=t
≤ 0 (35)
or
d2β(t)
dt2
+
1− λ
λc
d2α(t)
dt2
E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])d
2α(t)
dt2
+ (
1
c
− ησ2)
((
dα(t)
dt
)2
+ α(t)
d2α(t)
dt2
)
≤ 0
(36)
By diﬀerentiating (34) with respect to t, we ﬁnd
d2β(t)
dt2
+
1− λ
λc
d2α(t)
dt2
E [α]+λ
dα(t)
dt
+(λt+(1−λ)E [t])d
2α(t)
dt2
+(
1
c
−ησ2)
((
dα(t)
dt
)2
+ α(t)
d2α(t)
dt2
)
= 0
(37)
21
By using (36), (37) can be written more simply as
dα(t)
dt
≥ 0 (38)
Note that the local incentive constraint for employee t (expression (34)) implies the global incentive
constraint for t (expression (27)). Indeed let us consider t′ 6= t. Using (34), we can write
β(t)− β(t′) =
ˆ t
t′
β˙(τ)dτ (39)
= −
ˆ t
t′
(
1− λ
λ
α˙(τ)E [α]
c
+ (λτ + (1− λ)E [t])α˙(τ) + (1
c
− ησ2)α(τ)α˙(τ)
)
dτ
= −
ˆ t
t′
∂
∂τ
(
1− λ
λ
α(τ)E [α]
c
+ (λτ + (1− λ)E [t])α(τ) + 1
2
(
1
c
− ησ2)α2(τ)− λA(τ)
)
dτ
where A(τ) is a primitive of α(τ). We have
β(t)− β(t′) = −
[
1− λ
λ
α(τ)E [α]
c
+ (λτ + (1− λ)E [t])α(τ) + 1
2
(
1
c
− ησ2)α2(τ)
]t
t′
+
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ
= −1− λ
λ
α(t)E [α]
c
− (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t)− 1
2
(
1
c
− ησ2)α2(t) + 1− λ
λ
α(t′)E [α]
c
+(λt′ + (1− λ)E [t])α(t′) + 1
2
(
1
c
− ησ2)α2(t′) +
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ (40)
Hence
β(t) +
1− λ
λ
α(t)E [α]
c
+ (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t) + 1
2
(
1
c
− ησ2)α2(t)
= β(t′) +
1− λ
λ
α(t′)E [α]
c
+ (λt′ + (1− λ)E [t])α(t′) + 1
2
(
1
c
− ησ2)α2(t′) +
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ
= β(t′)+
1− λ
λ
α(t′)E [α]
c
+(λt+(1−λ)E [t])α(t′)+ 1
2
(
1
c
−ησ2)α2(t′)−λ(t−t′)α(t′)+
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ
(41)
Therefore u(t, t) = u(t, t′) − λ(t − t′)α(t′) + ´ tt′ λα(τ)dτ . However −λ(t − t′)α(t′) +
´ t
t′ λα(τ)dτ is
positive because we know from (38) that α(t) is increasing. As a consequence the global incentive
constraint is satisﬁed for type t.
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We now rewrite the maximization problem of the ﬁrm as a function of α(t) and u(t) instead of
α(t) and β(t). We know that u(t) = β(t) + 1−λλ
α(t)E[α]
c + (λt+ (1−λ)E [t])α(t) + 12c(1− cησ2)α2(t).
The incentive constraints (34) are replaced by the constraints du(t)dt = λα(t) and
dα(t)
dt ≥ 0.9 Using
du(t)
dt > 0 allows to write the participation constraint (26) as u(t) = w0. The maximization program
of the ﬁrm becomes
max
{α(t),u(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λc
+ λt+ (1− λ)E [t]− u(t)− 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (42)
under the constraints:
∀t ∈ T, du(t)
dt
= λα(t) (43)
∀t ∈ T, dα(t)
dt
= 0 (44)
u(t) = w0 (45)
Using (43) we can write
u(t)− u(t) =
tˆ
t
λα(τ)dτ (46)
Using (45) and (46), we rewrite (42) as
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λc
+ λt+ (1− λ)E [t]−
tˆ
t
λα(τ)dτ − w0 − 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
 f(t)dt
(47)
9Indeed du(t)
dt
= λα(t) +
(
dβ(t)
dt
+ 1−λ
λc
dα(t)
dt
E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t]) dα(t)
dt
+ ( 1
c
− ησ2)α(t) dα(t)
dt
)
, but the term in
parentheses is zero from the ﬁrst order condition (34).
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However
t¯ˆ
t
 tˆ
t
λα(τ)dτ
 f(t)dt =
F (t) tˆ
t
λα(τ)dτ
t
t
−
t¯ˆ
t
(λα(t))F (t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t)dt−
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t)F (t)dt =
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t) (1− F (t)) dt (48)
As a consequence the maximization problem of the ﬁrm becomes
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λc
+ λt+ (1− λ)E [t]− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt
(49)
subject to the constraints (44), or
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λc
+ t− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2c
(1 + cησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (50)
subject to (44).
Appendix 3. Proof of proposition 3.
We solve
max
p
p
E [t]− w0 + 1
2c(1 + cησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
(
1− cλ
2(p) (1− F (t))
f(t)
)2
f(t)dt
+ (1− p)(−w0) (51)
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Let X(t, p) = 1− cλ2(p)(1−F (t))f(t) . The ﬁrst order condition is
E [t] +
1
2c(1 + cησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
X2(t, p)f(t)dt
−p
 λ′(p)
c(1 + cησ2)λ3(p)
t¯ˆ
t
X2(t, p)f(t)dt+
2
c(1 + cησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
cλ(p)λ′(p)(1− F (t))
f(t)
X(t, p)f(t)dt
 = 0
(52)
or
E [t] +
1
c(1 + cησ2)λ2(p)
(
1
2
− ελ(p)
) t¯ˆ
t
X2(t, p)f(t)dt
− 2p
c(1 + cησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
cλ(p)λ′(p)(1− F (t))
f(t)
X(t, p)f(t)dt = 0 (53)
where ελ(p) =
pλ′(p)
λ(p) .
Let E(t) = tˆ. Suppose that employees are identical. Expression (53) reduces to
tˆ+
1
c(1 + cησ2)λ2(p)
(
1
2
− ελ(p)
)
= 0 (54)
If tˆ = 0 then the solution of (54) is p∗ = pˆ with ελ(pˆ) = 1/2. If tˆ > 0 then the solution of (54) is
p∗ > pˆ. It is easily veriﬁed that p∗ is increasing in tˆ.
Suppose employees are not identical (and hence necessarily tˆ > 0) then
´ t¯
t X
2(t, p)f(t)dt < 1.
The solution of (53) is p∗∗ < p∗ if tˆ is not too large.
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